by Martin Odoni

One tradition I do find fascinating at the close of every year is the publication of National Archives’ documents after their 30-Year-Rule protection expires. It is always a bug-bear of mine that this country does not feel its people are entitled to know much about what it does until three decades after the fact, but three decades later is better than a full lifetime later, I suppose. And it can be engrossing to learn more about the struggles that happened behind-the-scenes a generation ago.

One revelation in this year’s releases that got the BBC in its thrall is one that has been published a few years early – a row between Margaret Thatcher and her successor John Major, just weeks after he had taken over as Prime Minister in 1990.

By all accounts, when Thatcher had accepted the inevitable and resigned as Prime Minister in November that year, she had hoped Major would succeed and carry on her policy program. But in later times after he won the leadership, Thatcher increasingly undermined him as he moved in a (somewhat) more social-democratic direction. The row highlighted in the papers released this week – a row that took place on 3rd January 1991 – appears to have been the point that the divisions between them began.

The argument hinged on the issue of the Conservative Government of the time setting a very high minimum interest rate. Major had been Chancellor of the Exchequer before Thatcher had resigned, and had largely maintained the high interest rates around the 15% mark set by his predecessor, Nigel Lawson. Because of the never-ending difficulties with high inflation, which had tormented the British economy since the late-1960’s, both Lawson and Major had become obsessed with getting it under control. A frequent cause of inflation is excessive demand for goods; the more people buy goods and the scarcer they become, the more suppliers can charge for them, meaning prices go up, and so money in effect becomes less valuable. So one way of attempting to combat inflation – one whose effectiveness varies quite widely – is to encourage saving and to discourage manic spending by raising interest rates: A higher interest rate means people are likely to get extra money when saving up, while anyone borrowing money in order to purchase unnecessary goods would find themselves paying more interest on their loans. A Chancellor raising interest rates also encourages currency speculators to buy more sterling, as they will know that if they hold large numbers of pounds in UK accounts, they will again get more interest on them, which therefore can increase demand for the pound, and in turn make it more valuable.

But to discourage purchasing of goods is only a sensible move when there is too much economic activity, and when that is the main reason inflation is high. Inflation can happen for other reasons though, which means that a slow-moving economy is no guarantee that the currency will not lose value. As it happens, in late-1990, despite annual inflation being up around 7.5%, the UK economy had been in a slowdown for over a year as the (massively over-rated) ‘Lawson Boom‘ of the late-1980s rapidly ran out of steam, and the country was now moving into a recession. In any recession, more growth in Gross Domestic Product is required, which means more spending activity must be encouraged. Thatcher was therefore right to criticise the high interest rates; they were too high for a country that was in a recession. They needed to be set lower so that people would be discouraged from saving up as much, and even encouraged to borrow-and-spend more.

However, it must also be noted that Thatcher was being a hypocrite about the matter, because it was substantially her own fault that the interest rate had to remain so high. It was not for reasons of high inflation or low GDP as such.

The obstacle that Thatcher and Major had put in their own way was that the UK had joined the European Economic Community’s Exchange Rate Mechanism in October 1990 – just weeks before Thatcher was deposed. She had always opposed joining the ERM, but had finally given in to the inevitable when Major spoke out in favour, and having accepted it, she just decided that the UK would join the very next day – no planning, no calculations, no negotiations with the rest of the countries in the Mechanism. On 8th October, sterling entered the ERM.

Unfortunately, Thatcher’s timing was pretty awful. Joining the ERM was not necessarily a bad idea in itself, and might have worked pretty well if it had happened, say, in 1987, when the UK economy was near the height of the ‘Lawson Boom’. But by late-1990, the economy was back in its second annual recession in less than ten years. The Treasury therefore needed to cut interest rates to boost economic activity, but under ERM rules, the conditions of the time – the inflation-rate of the pound was fluctuating quite wildly and was at some stages roughly three times higher than the inflation-rate of the German Deutschmark – required higher interest rates to stabilise sterling’s relative value.

Joining the ERM in 1990 was therefore bound to pull the economy in two diametrically-opposed directions. The need to stimulate growth was at odds with the primary aim of the ERM, which was to fix the relative values of the currencies within it at roughly the same levels – the pound was meant to peg itself to the value of the Deutschmark.

With far higher inflation rates in the UK (almost 11% early in 1992) than in Germany (2.7%), but also with a high exchange-rate of 2.95DM to the pound, the British Treasury was giving itself a very difficult target exchange-rate to maintain right from the outset. The far higher rate of UK inflation meant that, right from the moment of joining the ERM, the pound’s value was already drifting away from the required valuation.

It was possible for the UK to join the ERM in 1990 and make it work, but only by artificially devaluing the pound first, say to a more manageable rate of 2.75DM. An artificial devaluation might well have slowed depreciation of sterling; any holders of large amounts of sterling who might have been planning to sell it off would suddenly find there was nothing to gain by doing so, and hence retain them, while any speculators would find a cheaper pound more appealing to invest in, increasing demand for the pound. More pertinently, a devaluation would also set a more realistic target exchange-rate to try and maintain. But at the time, devaluation of the currency was still seen in rather jingoistic “don’t-insult-our-beloved-pound!” terms by a wider British public who had little-or-no understanding of how currency exchanges work, and therefore would have seen such a move as somehow ‘sullying’ the country.

Thatcher never even paused to consider such matters in any event. Having lost Lawson as Chancellor of the Exchequer largely over the matter of joining the ERM less than a year earlier – he was heavily in favour while she was dead-set against – she could hardly risk losing Major from the role as well when he swiftly announced that he was in favour of the idea too. Clearly wanting the argument just to go away, Thatcher decided simply to leap in feet-first, without making sure conditions were right.

So Thatcher has to take a big chunk of the blame for the very problem she was complaining about. But Major also should not be let off the hook for the calamity that would eventually follow, as he too did not appear to consider the implications of joining the ERM during a recession with a much higher inflation level than the ‘target’ currency. Once that decision was made, Major’s hands were rather tied by ERM rules by the time that he took over at 10 Downing Street. Of course, he could have un-tied his hands at any time by suspending the UK’s membership of the ERM, but to compound the intial mistake he had shared with Thatcher, he stubbornly refused to suspend due to his narrow fixation on getting inflation down at any cost – something Kenneth Clarke and Gordon Brown were able to do more consistently in later years from outside the ERM.

To add to the UK’s ERM woes, international conditions became even less favourable. German state spending had increased markedly since 1990 due to the inevitable strains of reunification between East and West Germany, and this extra spending had led to a (relative) upswing in inflation of the Deutschmark. This caused the Bundesbank to increase interest rates to combat the effects, and under ERM rules, that made it impossible for the UK Government to lower its own interest rates. Britain’s finances were in a long-term double-deficit (exports lower than imports alongside public spending above tax income), made worse through early-1991 by a startling depreciation in the value of the US dollar, in which many British export goods were valued.

With the recession showing no signs of abating, speculators became convinced by September 1992 that suspension from the ERM would be unavoidable, probably followed by a devaluation of the pound to make sterling more attractive to purchasers and imports of British goods cheaper in other countries. The rise in German interest rates had lured currency speculators to start buying Deutschmarks in order to cash in on the higher dividends, often in exchange for pounds. This drop in demand for sterling and increased demand for the Deutschmark meant the pound was under growing pressure. Worried that their holdings would soon become less valuable, on the 16th, speculators brought about a familiar self-fulfilling prophecy; they dumped sterling in a frenzied rush of selling – a run-on-the-pound so notorious that it was given the nickname ‘Black Wednesday‘. As demand for the pound went through the floor, its value tumbled out-of-control.

The Bank of England spent billions in gold and foreign currency reserves to buy up pounds at the high ERM rate, in a frantic struggle to prop up sterling’s value. It did little to slow down its nosedive. Major ordered two large increases in interest rates during the course of the day, up to 15%, to tempt holders of sterling to resist selling with the reward of higher interest dividends on their pounds. Again, the rises failed, while also increasing the pain of the ongoing recession.

The pound lost 15% of its value in a single day, and it was clear that more was to come if drastic action was not taken immediately. Therefore, that very evening, the UK officially withdrew from the ERM, and the pound was artificially devalued, deterring holders of sterling from selling any further. Interest rates were eventually cut, giving the economy the breathing space to start growing again.

Ejection from the ERM was a complete reversal of the central pillar of Major’s entire economic policy, which had been built around the pound staying in the Mechanism, and on which he had staked his whole reputation. Black Wednesday was therefore a political disaster for the Conservative Party as much as the ERM fiasco had been an economic disaster for the country. Thousands of people lost their homes during membership, and the Major Government’s reputation for economic ‘soundness’ was irredeemably destroyed. Even though economic growth did finally recover healthily under Ken Clarke’s Chancellorship, Labour would win the 1997 General Election with the biggest landslide for any party since before the Second World War.

The story of who officially got the blame for the chaos instead of either Prime Minister is quite unjust. Norman Lamont, Major’s immediate successor as Chancellor, had lost his job within a year of Black Wednesday, scapegoated for an economic policy that he had faithfully tried to implement but with which he had never altogether agreed, and for a disaster that he was powerless to prevent. It is therefore perhaps ironic that one of his special advisors at the Treasury at the time would become a Prime Minister seventeen years later; –

Norman Lamont and a young David Cameron in 1992

Norman Lamont was Chancellor of the Exchequer during the notorious ‘Black Wednesday’ financial crash of 1992. Look who was one of his special Treasury advisers…

It should be noted that joining the ERM had not been a complete failure; inflation of the pound was brought down very substantially over the two years Britain was a member, and it paved the way for a new economic framework over the next ten years that helped keep a lid on sterling’s depreciation.


But the real drawback was that the pound had joined the Mechanism at least two years too late to get the most out of being part of it – by joining at the end of an economic boom rather than near its beginning – and then stayed in it at least three months longer than the time that it was able to provide the economy with any benefits while in the midst of a recession. Britain only joined when it did because of Thatcher’s bludgeoning impatience, and only stayed in as long as it did because of Major’s stubbornness. Both of which are examples of economic policy formulated by letting the heart rule the head. Cold, hard numbers seldom co-operate with that.

Britain’s dabbles in the ERM were not all that far from working well, but the mistakes of timing turned the whole exercise into a humiliating fiasco. Black Wednesday is therefore just one more example of how nonsensical is the notion that the Conservatives are ‘better’ at running the economy than Labour.

by Martin Odoni

Just before Christmas, journalist and Labour campaigner Abi Wilkinson confessed in the Guardian to having temporarily ‘lost faith’ in her party’s current leader.

Though I was too pessimistic to publicly back [Jeremy Corbyn], a part of me started to wonder, what if? What if the conventional wisdom was wrong and it really was possible to win a general election from the left? What if the tide of hope that was sweeping the party could be replicated at a national level? … … … But I came back down to earth with a bang… there are several reasons for the struggles the party initially faced under Corbyn’s leadership. By the time of the 2016 leadership challenge, almost every committed Labour supporter I knew was in a state of despair – no matter what faction of the party they belonged to. A few kept their hopes up – how I scoffed at their naivety.

I feel compelled to point out that Ms Wilkinson has made more than the one wrong assumption she is aware of.  In fairness, the other is a mistake a great many in the British public make, and one I subscribed to for a long time myself.

The Myth

That assumption is that Labour has a history of getting hammered in General Elections when campaigning from the left, and does better from the centre ground. On close examination, it is quite clear that the only time Labour truly tried to get elected from the left since the Second World War was under Clement Attlee in 1945 – and they won in a big landslide.

Contrary to popular myth, no Labour leader between Attlee and Corbyn (with the possible exception of Michael Foot, but his 1983 General Election campaign does not count for reasons outlined below) has been a ‘Real Leftist’.

Labour leaders since WWII

The leaders of the Labour Party since World War II. In spiral-inwards order from top-left: Michael Foot, Jeremy Corbyn, Jim Callaghan, Neil Kinnock, Gordon Brown, Ed Miliband, Clement Attlee, John Smith, Tony Blair, Harold Wilson and Hugh Gaitskell.

Gaitskell, 1955-1963

Attlee’s successor, Hugh Gaitskell, spent much of his fruitless time in charge of the Labour Party fighting against the left wing as much as he fought the Tories, and he never won an Election. Gaitskell was the first Labour leader to attempt to abolish Clause IV, due to his centrist policies meeting with frequent opposition from Trade Unions.

Wilson, 1963-1976

Harold Wilson won three General Elections (arguably four, depending how one chooses to view the Hung Parliament of early-1974), as a social democrat who managed to unite the Labour Party, largely by fooling the left into believing he was a socialist. Like Gaitskell before him, Wilson was, in practice, frequently at loggerheads with the likes of Tony Benn, and had a notorious dislike of Marxists. Wilson, always far more effective as a Labour leader than as a Prime Minister, governed Britain for roughly eight years, but beyond his establishment of the Open University, radical – or even significant – policy achievements in his time are barely detectable among long periods of treading water, due in part to the economic difficulties created by industrial decline since the mid-1950s.

Callaghan, 1976-1980

Jim Callaghan epitomises one of the enduring myths of the 1970s. The popular notion long espoused by the British right, including most particularly by Margaret Thatcher in the 1980s, was that ‘Labour socialism’ was the cause of the industrial chaos and economic stagnation of the 1970s. The notorious ‘Winter of Discontent‘ industrial unrest of 1978 almost certainly guaranteed Callaghan’s defeat by Thatcher in the following year’s Election. But in reality, the problems of the 1970’s had become a crisis far earlier, under the Conservative Government of Edward Heath during 1972-to-1973, and spiralled out of control due to international conditions created by the OPEC Oil Shock. As for the suggestion that Callaghan’s administration was ‘socialist’, this is insanity. He would have been better suited to the Liberal Party, and during his brief time as Prime Minister, he effectively laid the foundations for Thatcherism by following the International Monetary Fund’s demands for drastic cuts in Government expenditure, to combat the hectic inflation-rates of the previous few years. As the late Tony Benn revealed in subsequent years, Callaghan and his Chancellor of the Exchequer, Denis Healey, were well aware that these cuts were no longer necessary, due to the potential ‘inflation-brake’ that could be applied via North Sea Oil e.g. the Government could have insisted that all oil exports from the UK had to be paid for in sterling, increasing demand for, and by extension the value of, British pounds. The spending cuts that Healey insisted on carrying out anyway in fact arguably provoked the Winter of Discontent – and the cuts were effectively anti-socialist, and began the nationwide move to the neoliberal right. It was not the ‘socialist’ nature of the Labour Party in the 1970s that was causing the hardship, it was its centrism.

Foot, 1980-1983

While Michael Foot was a left-wing party leader, Labour’s 1983 General Election campaign cannot be realistically viewed as a true attempt to win power on a left-wing platform. This is partly because Foot never had any real control of the party in the three years he was in the role – Benn and Healey were engaged in a prolonged ‘tug-of-war’ for control throughout – but mainly because the party’s National Executive Committee of the time were not really trying to win. Thanks to the long in-fighting between factions, and the break-off of the Social Democratic Party, Labour was in no shape to return to Government, while Thatcher’s success in the Falklands War the previous year had given the Conservatives a massive boost in chest-banging, jingoistic popularity. The Labour NEC therefore realised, even before their Manifesto was written up, that the Election was already lost, but that it also presented them with a perfect opportunity to discredit the left wing for generations to come; by campaigning on a very left-wing ‘Bennite’ platform in an Election that was already lost, they could then blame the platform for the defeat when it was confirmed. And that is precisely what happened.

Kinnock, 1983-1992

Neil Kinnock might have been a left-winger before becoming leader, but as soon as he was voted into the job to succeed Foot, he moved the party even further to the right than it had been under Wilson or Callaghan, by effectively cutting off the left wing altogether. He is especially vilified by the miners of the 1980s, after he effectively abandoned them during the Miners’ Strikes of 1984-85, during which he left them with nobody prominent to speak up for them in Parliament.

Smith, 1992-1994

John Smith is sometimes held up as a real socialist whose premature death in 1994, after two years as leader, somehow deprived the UK of a proper left-wing Prime Minister. (Apologies to the Angry Yorkshireman, but his endorsement of Smith earlier this year is based almost entirely on one speech, doubtfully taken at face-value.) Smith is a little like many loved political/leadership figures of the past – such as Richard The Lionheart or Vladimir Ilyitch Lenin – in that he is only assumed to be a man of wise and benevolent Government because he died before the full effects of his policies could be felt. “If only he had lived on, his country would have been a much better place…” is the classic refrain. But if the world had had more experience of what their governance was really like, it is doubtful that we would be able to see much difference between them and the much-vilified successors who ruled in their stead. (Judging by his actions on Crusade, morally, Richard the Lionheart is difficult to distinguish from his maligned brother ‘Bad King’ John, and it was Lenin, not Joseph Stalin, who was responsible for the ‘Red Terror‘ of the Chekhists in 1918.) The clue that should lead us to doubt that Smith was greatly different from those who followed him is that, for better or worse, he made constitutional changes to the party,  weakening the Trade Unions, and saw Tony Blair and Gordon Brown as his natural successors. Given he knew them better than anyone else in party circles, and effectively mentored them both, he could only have seen them as his successors if he was roughly as far from the left as they were.

Blair, 1994-2007, & Brown, 2007-2010

So when Tony Blair established ‘New Labour’ in the 1990s, yes, he was even more conservative than any of his predecessors, but he was really just formalising an unspoken reality; that the Labour Party was a centrist political faction that was manipulating and controlling the British Left. ‘Old Labour’ as he called it – by which he meant left-wing-and-soft-left socialists in the Labour Party – had never really been in charge in the first place. And despite the personal animosity that developed between them, Gordon Brown was much the same. All ‘New Labour’ were really doing was making the party’s portfolio glossier while reducing the scope for the ‘Real Left’ to rebel against them effectively.

Miliband, 2010-2015, & Corbyn, 2015-?

As for Ed Miliband, he did try to move the party a little to the left while he was leader, but by his own admission, he was still a member of New Labour and needed to be more radical than he dared to try. Other Parliamentary Party members tried to blame the calamitous defeat in the 2015 General Election on his move to the left, when in truth it would have been wiser to blame his failure to move far enough to the left. And while Jeremy Corbyn in this year’s General Election was making a very strong attempt to get elected from the left, an awful lot of his party were clearly doing no more than going through the motions.

Centrism keeps failing

The long years of electoral under-achievement by the Labour Party were more to do with centrist failure than socialist ‘dreaming’, and stretch decades further back into history than the emergence of Blair. ‘Old Labour’ and ‘socialist Labour’ have not been synonymous since at least 1950, and the peculiar economic turbulence of the 1970s had nothing to do with socialism going wrong, but with underlying weaknesses in British core industries that had needed phasing out and replacing during the long-running feud between Wilson and Heath. (Wilson’s failure to try, and Heath’s foolish-but-understandable attempt to prop up these industries early in the 1970s, demonstrate the former’s lack of daring and the latter’s lack of imagination.)

Corbyn therefore differs from the past to which he is often accused of trying to return, whereas the likes of Blair were always more consistent with that past than his own rhetoric would have us believe. Abi Wilkinson is far from the first person, and very unlikely to be the last, to be taken in by the fiction that the Labour Party of the 1980s-and-before was left wing, and centrist thereafter. But it is another of those fictions that is in sore need of being combatted. Neoliberalism did not solve the problems left behind by socialism, because the British Governments of the 1960s and 1970s were not socialist, and the problems were caused by a mix of obsolete industries and international fuel crises. And far from being a solution, neoliberalism simply added rapid recession-cycles to the other problems.

Can socialism, even of the mild variety that Corbyn stands for, resolve the chaos of monetarism and the limitations of Keynesianism? Maybe, maybe not. But we will never find out the true answer to that so long as people wrongly imagine that the economic and industrial policy Corbyn is proposing is merely something that has ‘already been tried’.


December 13, 2017

by Martin Odoni

Did you hear them?

Theresa May has lost a binding vote in the House of Commons tonight. You suspect that will happen to her again soon, unless she does something she was being advised to do in the aftermath.

Did you hear them, offering said advice?

Here is the big moment. Listen to the Opposition benches. Listen as they call out, “Resign!”

Yes, it has started; the chorus that has echoed down the centuries when a Government’s mast has toppled over. The demand that its leader should resign. It is often a very bad sign for the incumbent party when Opposition parties start making that demand.

May will have some serious thinking to do after tonight. She’s been hamstrung by her own hubris for over six months, and tonight the precariousness of her position was cruelly exposed. A small rebellion on the Government backbenches of just eleven was enough to defeat the Prime Minister, and force a Commons vote on the final deal as the UK leaves the European Union. That small number is doubly remarkable when one considers that seven Labour MPs supported the Government, who still lost by 309 to 305.

This is no small matter for the Government; the Conservative upper echelons were clearly desperate not to lose this vote. The Tory Whips are understood to have reduced one woman MP to tears today as they tried to force her into line. A last-gasp concession was also tabled to lure potential rebels to support the Government, or at least to abstain. Stephen Hammond, one of the rebels, was sacked as Deputy Chairman of the Conservative Party within an hour of the vote. Oh, it matters all right.

The loss means that the pro-Brexit fanatics on the extremist fringe of the Tory party will now be wondering whether there is much point in supporting May any further. Not now that it looks a dead certainty that she cannot deliver a complete severance from the EU, in line with what they want. She also has yet more talks with EU leaders tomorrow, who will sit opposite her at the European Council table in full knowledge that this woman does not really govern, she merely presides. Meanwhile, Dominic Grieve and his fellow pro-Remain rebels have seen that when they dare to speak out against May’s handling of Brexit, it can have an effect. A bruising effect.

So with the Opposition benches now emboldened enough to call out, “Resign!“, with the anti-Brexit faction on the Government benches emboldened by seeing how effective they can be, and the pro-Brexit faction looking increasingly unimpressed by what May has to offer, why does May not do as suggested and resign? All she has to look forward to if she stays on is more powerless chaos.

In the 1840’s, Benjamin Disraeli, a rebellious Tory MP in his own right long before becoming a Tory Prime Minister, was at loggerheads with his leader, Sir Robert Peel, over the proposed repeal of the Corn Laws. During the spat, Disraeli famously described Conservative Governments as “organised hypocrisy”. But as tonight has demonstrated, that description is nonsense.

There is nothing “organised” about Conservative Governments.

by Martin Odoni

Irrespective of whether we think Brexit is a good idea or a bad one, there can be no escaping the reality that its execution is going incredibly badly. After Monday’s utterly shambolic wall-crash over finding a new settlement for the Irish border – perhaps the single most important conundrum that needs solving – matters somehow plumbed even danker depths today. David Davis, Secretary of State for Exiting The European Union, finally revealed in Parliament what many of us had been suspecting for weeks.

Answering questions from the House Of Commons Exiting the EU Committee, Davis admitted that neither he nor anyone else inthe Government had carried out the so-called ‘Brexit Impact Assessments’ i.e. the many complex and detailed calculations about how leaving the EU is going to affect British society, particularly its economy. This was after over a year of his repeated assurances to the House and the wider country that over fifty such assessments had been completed.

This deceit amounts to Contempt-of-Parliament, and could have dire repercussions for Davis’ future as an MP. Quite rightly, other MPs such as David Lammy, anti-Brexit campaigners such as Gina Miller, mainstream media commentators such as Rafael Behr, and many left-wing bloggers such as my old comrade-in-arms Mike Sivier of Vox Political, are calling for Davis’ resignation, and for the DExEU Committee to press for formal charges of contempt.


Yes, David, that’s pretty much everybody else’s reaction, to every aspect of Brexit.

I certainly do not oppose such demands. Davis’ behaviour has been outrageous, and in most industries it would not only mean summary dismissal, but also possible legal proceedings. Thanks to Parliamentary Privilege – neither House of the Palace Of Wesminster is subject to the Law of the Land – fraud charges may not be possible. But the Speaker of the Commons, John Bercow, does have it in his power to suspend Davis from the House, or possibly refer the matter to the public under the Recall Of MPs Act of 2015.

Parliament is already a bad comedy thanks to its domination for decades by shallow, media-friendly, image-obsessive automata. For it to retain any credibility it has left, it has to sanction Davis, and sanction him hard. If an MP can be found to lie casually within the House of Commons on this scale, after all, what point will Parliament have at all? Its first purpose is to hold incumbent Governments to account, and that cannot happen if the precedent is set that there are no consequences for measurable deceit.

But I would not stop at Davis. Nor would I stop at his department. The entire administration now has to go.

Every MP on the Opposition benches, in Labour, in the SNP, in the Liberal Democrats, in Plaid Cymru, Caroline Lucas of the Green Party, and all the ‘Others’, must now unite to demand that the whole Government of Theresa May resign. The position of the entire administration is untenable, and not just because of Davis’ fabrications. The Government’s position has in fact been indictable since the day Article-50 was activated in March, and so the whole Government has to stand down.

What Davis has admitted is even more serious than some people realise; no one in the Conservative Party has been making necessary assessments of Brexit’s likely effects. The Referendum was effectively called in May 2015 when the Tories won that year’s General Election, including it as a gesture to ‘buy’ up assurances of support from the party’s extremist fringe. Since then, two-and-a-half years have passed, during which the Referendum has been and gone, the Leave vote won, Article-50 has been activated, and we have had approximately six months of fruitless negotiations in Brussels. In all of that time, no one in either Cameron’s Government or May’s has even bothered to assess what the actual impact of Brexit will be?

That admission is even more appalling than Davis’ fictitious boasts about what a thorough assessment his department had carried out. After all, if the country does not know what impact ending the current settlement with the EU will have, how can it know what it will need from the new settlement? Little wonder therefore that negotiations with the EU’s representatives are going so badly, when British officials and politicians do not even know the implications of anything they ask for, or even precisely what they need to ask for, or for that matter what will happen if they do not get what they ask for. They have been driving in the dark without headlights for half a year, which has meant progress has not only been difficult, it has been logically impossible; how can progress be made towards a destination that has not even been identified or defined?

These details were central to everything about how Brexit is to be carried out, and until they were properly calculated, it was insanity on Theresa May’s part choosing to activate Article-50 so soon. It started a two-year countdown, and over half of the first year of precious negotiating time has been wasted on a reckless General Election backfire, and aimless thrashing-about when finally at the table. There is no point in childishly continuing to blame EU officials for the logjams, the fault is entirely on the British side.

Have we ever known chaos in Government quite like this? In living memory, the UK has seen infighting, economic tribulations, weak Governments and social unrest. But the current instability is something of a quite unusual order, and as yet, we have not even withdrawn from the EU. Can you imagine what will happen when we do? Brexit has exposed incompetence unprecedented in any British Government since before the World Wars, and Theresa May’s whole administration is implicated in it from top to bottom.

By failing to carry out the Brexit impact assessment, the Conservative Government is guilty of dereliction-of-duty, and so must resign and call a fresh General Election for early in the New Year.